This is a reissue of Professor Natanson’s 1951 monograph, the first such study of Being and Nothingness to appear in English. After an introductory essay on the nature of existentialism, the author begins a brief but lucid exposition of the major issues of Sartre’s masterwork: the quest for a phenomenological ontology, temporality, nothingness, the problem of the Other, the Self, including the categories of freedom, situation, and death, and the nature of existential psychoanalysis. The remainder of the book is devoted (...) to an evaluation of Sartre’s enterprise from the viewpoint of Husserl’s phenomenology. Natanson’s fundamental objection hits upon a point which clearly distinguishes Sartre from Husserl, viz., the former’s insistence that intentionality be understood as justifying a metaphysical realism through a kind of ontological argument whereby consciousness is consciousness of transphenomenal Being, the realm of the en-soi. According to Natanson, this crucial Sartrean move is not phenomenological except in a Hegelian sense. And if the influence of Heidegger’s concept of "revelation" is admitted, the author points out that this, too, is a distortion of Husserlian method. In fact, he finds Sartre’s book a methodological melange of quasi-phenomenology, "revealing intuitions" of Being, and outright psychologism. (shrink)

This pioneer work in comparative political analysis manifests once more the growing influence of behavioral approaches on the study of politics. In this case the general topic is the voting pattern of justices on the highest courts of several Pacific nations and India. Various heuristic and explanatory models are employed to determine the influence of such variables as age, culture, and political orientation on the adjudicative behavior of these men over a determinate period. Although the articles by twelve different authors (...) are not all of the same analytic caliber as those contributed by the editors themselves, they collectively offer an insight into the possibilities as well as into the pitfalls of behavioral studies of the judiciary. As the editors note, such a work is necessarily hypothetical and exploratory, raising more questions than it answers. Philosophers will be interested mainly in the methodological problems of concept formation and explanation which this book raises and seeks to resolve. The article by Edward J. Weissman, "Mathematical Theory and Dynamic Models," is particularly valuable from that point of view. Moreover, by classifying and comparing the other contributions to this volume, Weissman's article furnishes a certain unity which the book as a whole sorely lacks. Geared primarily for those who are familiar with such techniques as smallest-space analysis and the use of recursive causal models, this work nevertheless can be read with profit by social philosophers, philosophers of law and those interested in general questions of methodology.--T. R. F. (shrink)

This is one of the best written and most comprehensive studies of the development of Sartre’s thought yet to appear in English, which is not to say that it covers every facet of his variegated career. Written by the former editor of Yale French Studies and current chairman of the Department of Romance Languages at Wesleyan University, Connecticut, it emphasizes Sartre’s literary works and thus belongs most properly in the category of literary criticism or the history of ideas. Still, McMahon (...) does not ignore Sartre’s philosophical writings. Indeed, he gives particular attention to The Critique of Dialectical Reason, a volume often avoided by authors who approach Sartre from a literary tradition. But the philosophic sources are usually consulted to explain or illustrate the literary, which provide the object of the author’s prime concern. McMahon underscores three concepts which measure Sartre’s intellectual growth, viz., freedom, love, and history. Regarding freedom, Sartre has "completed" the unfinished analyses of Being and Nothingness with their excessive individualism by his growing awareness that freedom is more than the ability to say "No" to the Other; it has a positive content and requires collective action to be maintained. Likewise, love is now conceived as a bond of promises which envisages the achievement of common projects. McMahon labels this rather cold-blooded concept "pragmatic love." Finally, history, which emerges as Sartre’s absolute, is now understood as a force conditioning men and limiting the availability of their choices. Sartre has come under the sway of Engels’ dictum: "Men make their history themselves, but they make it within a given milieu which conditions them." Sartre relies heavily upon the power of dialectic to keep individual choice afloat in a sea of historical forces. Whether or not he succeeds is a current question. McMahon believes that he does not. Because what he calls the "shift of emphasis" in Sartre’s thought from the individual to the social involves a growing interest in the sciences humaines, McMahon’s failure to consider Sartre’s political writings at any length is the chief disappointment of this excellent study. And then there is that stepchild of Sartriana, Existentialism is a Humanism. Following Cumming and others, McMahon chooses to ignore this essay, probably because Sartre himself has repudiated it. But if anyone is to portray Sartre "warts and all," and McMahon does not hesitate to expose the blemishes, then the reckless and inconsistent statements of this short lecture are most revealing. They indicate the freewheeling motions of a "shift" underway. Each chapter is followed by a short but helpful discussion of related themes and works. To capture the world of Jean-Paul Sartre is a most ambitious project. McMahon has met this challenge with insight and style.—T. R. F. (shrink)

One of the latest volumes in the "Modern Masters" series edited by Frank Kermode, this small, introductory study exhibits that admixture of philosophical acuity, wit, and style which we have come to associate with the work of Arthur Danto. That a thinker noted for his significant contributions to the analytic tradition should focus his attention on the prince of existentialists is itself something of a Wunder. That he does not approach Sartre like a silhouette-maker appraising an impressionist painting reveals Danto’s (...) own catholicity as well as the clarity and rigor of Sartre’s underlying insights and arguments. After acknowledging a professional debt to Sartre: "I have quarried Sartre’s work like a Barbarini over the years, taken fragments of his thought which I would never, I am certain, have been able to think of by myself," Danto employs a structural and synchronic approach to elucidate "the Sartrian system..., the most important and least accessible and most widely misappreciated of all that he has done." The elements of that system which Danto examines are five, treated in as many chapters. Characteristic of the book’s irenic spirit, each chapter bears two titles, one the canonized Sartrian term and the other Danto’s translation of the same into current analytic discourse. So we are offered: "Ambiguity: or, Language and Existence" ; "Nothingness: or, Consciousness and Ontology" ; "Engagement: or, Knowledge, Action, and the World" ; "Shame: or, The Problem of Other Minds" ; and "Anguish: or, Factual Beliefs and Moral Attitudes". (shrink)

This analytic survey should soon appear in English translation with Cambridge University Press in its new series, "Modern European Philosophy," edited by Alan Montefiore. As the title suggests, its leitmotif is the dialectic of same and other, first stated by Kojève in its explicit Hegelian mode of identity and contradiction and transposed during the sixties into that of difference and repetition. Descombes’s book is an account of how the generation of the three H’s was supplanted by that of the "masters (...) of suspicion," Marx, Nietzsche, and Freud. His point of departure is Kojève’s Hegel lectures which, he argues, had a determining influence on subsequent French philosophic thought. Central to the process was Kojève’s humanizing of the negative, le néant. Sartre naturally enters the scene at this point but exits without a hint of his own major study of dialectical reason. Merleau-Ponty receives more extended treatment, probably because he is portrayed as a bridge figure, though not only that, to the semiologists and philosophers of history of the sixties and seventies. When it comes time to define structure, Descombes takes Michel Serres’s quasi-mathematical definition as canonical. In fact, he insists that anything less yields pseudostructuralism, a statement which Foucault would doubtless second, if only to dissociate himself from that party once and for all. Serres and Lévi-Strauss are treated under the rubric of semiology with the aid of some very clear descriptions of the relation between semiology and structuralism in the strict sense. Next Descombes considers the Foucault of The Order Of Things and the complete Althusser as critics of History. The problem of difference enables him to treat Derrida and one aspect of Deleuze together. Deleuze reappears in the final chapter, "The End of Time," accompanied by the later Foucault, Klossowski, and Lyotard. (shrink)

This collection of thirteen essays, several of which appear in print for the first time, reveals in concrete fashion Professor Grene’s intellectual evolution from positivistic criticism of Heidegger to more recent censures of empiricism as "a singularly narrow metaphysic disguised as antimetaphysical". Although most of these essays are less than ten years old, she marks her terminus a quo by including a 1938 piece, "A Note on the Philosophy of Heidegger: Confessions of a Young Positivist". In fact, a critical attitude (...) toward her former professor is one of the constants throughout this volume. At the base of her appraisal of Heidegger lies a personal revulsion at the man’s politics and a skeptical attitude toward his obscurantism and the cult which has developed around him. In Chapter VI, "Heidegger: Philosopher and Prophet", she weighs the proportion of "trickery to truth" in his earlier and later works and finds the balance moving decisively toward trickery as the years progress. By now, however, she has come to respect the Heideggerian message that human existence is radically finite—"this is the root concept of all existentialist literature, which received in Sein und Zeit its definitive philosophic expression" —and that "language is poetry, and literal language but a desiccated and residual poetry". She expands the latter theme along her own lines in Chapter XI, "The True Teachers of Mankind", by marshaling "a series of possible grounds for a defense of poetic language in the form of a transcendental argument". In effect, she adopts von Humboldt’s notion of language as "a world between minds and things" and argues that this feature is uniquely evident in poetry, concluding that "if language without this quality would not be language, then the poetic use of speech is indeed a necessary condition for the existence of language as such". Among those cited in support of her claim, Jacques Derrida merits the greatest attention. He emerges at the center of her next essay, "Life, Death, and Language: Some Thoughts on Wittgenstein and Derrida", though ultimately to be held at some distance along with the later Wittgenstein himself for offering us "Wonderland philosophies". Two essays which share the title of the collection analyze respectively the European sources of recent Anglo-American philosophy and the reception of continental philosophy in America. And the whole is introduced by reflections on the apparent inconclusiveness of philosophical inquiry. (shrink)

This latest volume in Ted Honderick's series, "The Arguments of the Philosophers," is a concise analytical survey of Sartre's major philosophical works from The Transcendence of the Ego to his Flaubert study, The Family Idiot. Caws brings to the standard themes of such readings the critical stance of a mind trained in physics and the philosophy of science yet tempered by wide and sympathetic acquaintance with recent Continental philosophy. In this respect he joins Arthur Danto, Alan Montefiore, Charles Taylor, and (...) others who have sought to bridge the philosophical distance which separates the Continent from the English-speaking world. (shrink)

After an introductory chapter on Sartre as "the man of words" where she argues that he is first of all a philosophical, rather than imaginative writer, Professor Grene directs this interesting essay to the subject of Sartre’s philosophic predecessors. These she gathers into two groups, devoting a chapter to each: Descartes and the phenomenologists on the one hand, and the dialecticians, Hegel, Kierkegaard, and Marx, on the other. She adds some valuable notes to the chorus of those who have criticized (...) Sartre’s Cartesianism with her observations on his concepts of mind/body, time, and freedom. His root theoretical error, she believes, lies in the assumption that non-thetic, non-reflective consciousness is primarily self-referential—in Sartre’s famous phrase, that it is consciousness self. She recommends instead Michael Polanyi’s "subsidiary awareness" as being at the base of even the most plainly intuitive, positional awareness of an object. The latter, she feels, places the knower directly in the world and thereby precludes the solipsism to which Sartre’s Cartesian position inevitably falls prey. (shrink)

Having distinguished herself as a translator of Sartre and after excursions of her own into existentialist ethics and literary theory, it is not surprising that Professor Barnes was chosen by editor Walter Kaufman to write this popular survey for his series of portraits, devoted to "figures who have changed the world we live in." Most of her study is devoted to Sartre’s philosophic, literary, and political activity after 1940 when she dates his politicization. Her basic thesis throughout is that what (...) Sartre offers us is a unified and total view and that there is merely a "shift of emphasis" between Being and Nothingness and the Critique of Dialectical Reason. Central to this unified view is Sartre’s abiding faith in man’s radical freedom, i.e., his conviction that man can remake his past, whatever may have been made of it by others or himself. She feels that the "philosophy of revolution" enunciated in his essay "Materialism and Revolution" represents the nucleus of consistency in his career. Whatever change we observe in his thought centers on the moves from individualistic freedom to freedom within the group and from emphasis on consciousness and "choice of being" to "lived experience", a form of awareness which is much more opaque and self-restricting. Much of her thesis relies on the plausible claim that the interpersonal relations described in BN are predicated on the assumption of general bad faith. But they, like the scarcity discussed in the Critique, are largely superable limitations and are in fact overcome, if only temporarily, in the group-in-fusion. (shrink)

Originally published in 1965, this informed and important, if disputed, essay is one of several book-length studies of Sartre’s later thought to have appeared in Italy over the least decade. The book concentrates on the general argument of the Critique of Dialectical Reason. Its overall tone is critical without being carping. Chiodi states his main thesis in the preface, namely, that Sartre differs from Marx by identifying alienation with [[sic]] objectification, a corollary to any philosophy which accords a privileged status (...) to the subjective. He develops this point in detail over six chapters dealing, respectively, with existentialism and Marxism, existence and project, the dialectic, necessity, state and society, and alienation. Two of Chiodi’s articles from the Rivista di filosofia are included as appendices, viz., "Existentialism and Marxism" and "The Concept of ‘Alienation’ in Existentialism." Both are valuable historicocritical analyses. (shrink)

Although the number of articles on Sartre’s aesthetic is great, book-length treatments of the subject in any language are rare. In English, we have been practically limited to Eugene Kaelin’s important study of Sartre and Merleau-Ponty published ten years ago. This work by George Bauer provides a valuable complement to Kaelin’s theoretical analysis. The book consists of seven chapters and an appendix which treat of Sartre’s pronouncements on art and the artist as expressed in his novels and plays as well (...) as in his art and literary criticism, genre by genre and artist by artist. Philosophically, the most interesting portion of the book is probably the introductory chapter presenting an eleven-page synopsis of the elements of Sartrean aesthetics: the separation of prose from poetry with its attendant problem of committed literature, the work of art as imaginary object, and the aesthetic significance of Sartre’s distinction between existence and being. It is this last element which Bauer exploits as he examines Sartre’s repeated strictures against artists who confuse the being of the art object with physical being or who flee the responsibility of human existence for some "project of being." If art is not "reality" for Sartre, neither is it a legitimate means of escape. Because his evaluations involve reference to content as well as form, Sartre’s criticism has assumed a sociopolitical posture from the very start. The overall impression left by Bauer’s work is that Sartre’s art criticism involves the often inconsistent application of relatively few criteria to quite select works of the artists in question in accord with a general theory of human freedom. Despite the occasional brilliance and unfailing intelligence of the judgments so produced, Sartre’s method leaves him vulnerable to the charge of unfairness and inadequacy. Readers desiring an extended analysis of Sartre’s general aesthetic theory will still find Kaelin’s book indispensable. Physically, this is a most attractive volume, featuring thirty-two prints as well as a Calder cartoon of Sartre on its cover.—T. R. F. (shrink)

Described in the blurb as "the first systematic account of Sartre’s phenomenology of religion," King’s work also locates Sartre’s observations in the tradition of religious mysticism which Sartre is said to have studied in the early ‘30s. In fact, one of King’s most telling criticisms throughout the exposition is that Sartre was not faithful enough to the phenomena of mysticism, sacrificing phenomenology to his ontological commitments whenever the two seemed to conflict. The opening chapter sets the theme by treating the (...) "theological complex" ascribed to each man in virtue of his futile passion to be the conscious foundation of his own being, that is, to be in-itself-for-itself or God. This complex, developed by the child’s likening of its parents to divinities beneath whose gaze it secures an object-like being, generates what King in his final chapter terms the bourgeois "ideal of being," viz., the flight from subjectivity and freedom to absolute objectivity. He distinguishes this ideal from the artist’s ideal of nothingness and the worker’s ideal of doing. What has this to do with the sacred? Basically, these ideals mark the termini a quo and ad quem of Sartre’s evolving notion of God, perhaps the major claim of King’s study. (shrink)

A sign of Sartre’s belated "coming of age" in professional, English-speaking philosophical circles is the recent shift from exposition to dialogue as analytic authors regard his contribution to current Anglo-American philosophical discussion. One of the interests, not to say obsessions, of analysis has been the philosophy of mind. The literature is vast, and alternative positions have been charted in detail. It is a virtue of Professor Morris’ book that she has mastered a respectable portion of the analytic terrain. Her treatment (...) of Sartre is limited to the writings up to and including Being and Nothingness. The statement of the question is analytic, the response Sartrean. Her assessment of the exchange is that "the concept of a person to be found in Sartre’s early work is not only intelligible but significant. He has led us away from some of the idle considerations in much contemporary analytic discussion of persons qua perceivers and has offered important and probably correct solutions to some of the most pressing and central problems connected with persons considered as moral agents". Thus the standard criteria for reidentification of persons, viz., memory, character, and bodily continuity, are viewed in terms of accountability, thereby underscoring Sartre’s "new criterion of personal identity," fundamental project or ideal self. Crucial to her general thesis is the ambiguity of the "I" for Sartre. The term denotes the body-subject of conscious relations and possessor of physical properties, on the one hand, and a free unification of acts and experiences over time, on the other, like a melody synthesizing individual notes—a standard simile in nonsubstantial theories of the self. She argues that both aspects of the "I" are required to resolve the matter of accountability as we understand it. The question of other minds is raised in the context of Sartre’s claim that "there is nothing behind the body. The body is wholly ‘psychic'." This problematic assertion not only makes his concept of shame-consciousness appear less ad hoc but helps warrant, as well, her claim that he is leaning toward a physicalism "broad enough to include the intentional properties of consciousness". An indication that analysis may be heading in the same direction is taken as an added sign of Sartre’s relevance. (shrink)

This collection of six essays, three of which have appeared elsewhere, concentrates on revising popular interpretations of Kierkegaard’s thought. Among the counterpositions developed is the claim that Johannes Climacus, pseudonymous author of the Philosophical Fragments and the Concluding Unscientific Postscript, was not a theist and the suggestion that Kierkegaard may not have been one either—a paradox worthy of the Dane. Klemke’s argument implies that Climacus anticipated an immanentistic approach to religious faith which leaves its propositional nature in abeyance, if not (...) rejected entirely. For the Christian to assert "Christ is God," for example, "is not to say something about a certain historical person’s having possessed a nonworldly attribute, etc.," but is rather "to say something primarily about one’s self, the utterer, that one’s self has been reorganized, reintegrated in a certain way". Kierkegaard’s infamous credo quia absurdum is thus shorn of irrationalism. In fact, Klemke insists that "absurd" and "paradox" have a very special meaning for Kierkegaard. Both terms refer not to logical contradiction but to the existential paradox of thought in relation to existence, viz., that existence is a limit which reflection cannot reach, and especially to the behavioral paradox, the lived contradiction between another vital set of values and one’s own, e.g., the challenge of "encounter" with Christ. The notion of behavioral paradox is central to Klemke’s text, figuring in three of the six essays. (shrink)

After pointing out that Augustine's appreciation of Aristotle is narrowly limited by the former's religious interests, Mr. Schneider argues that in the realms in which their interests overlapp--theology and psychology--Augustine may be fruitfully regarded as carrying to completion the principle lines of Aristotle's analysis, and that this is due to a common basic interest in and body of opinion on ontology.--R. F. T.

Bracken finds that the Principles was very inadequately reviewed in the first instance, and that excerpts from it in Chambers' Encyclopedia may have furnished the source for a number of later attacks on Berkeley.--R. F. T.

Disturbed by the fact that most commentators and anthologists never bother to inquire seriously whether Sartre's admittedly influential ethics is rationally defensible, Anderson intends to demonstrate that a Sartrean ethics is coherent and plausible, "once certain initial choices are made". These elective assumptions are that human choice is the sole source of moral value and that one values a meaningful or justified life and prizes specifically logic and consistency. Though scarcely irrational "choices," they do raise the question of the presumed (...) ultimacy of freedom in Sartrean ethics, Anderson's most telling criticism of a system with which he is on the whole rather sympathetic. (shrink)

This is a translation and updating of the already indispensable Les Écrits de Sartre. Not only does it cover Sartre’s writings over three more years, up to April, 1973, but it supplements with additional material those years related in the original edition.